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Abstract
Google Nest devices have seen a rise in demand especially with Google’s huge advantage in search engine results and a com-
plex ecosystem that consists of a range of companion devices and compatible mobile applications integrated and interacting 
with its virtual assistant, Google Assistant. This study undertakes the forensics extraction and analysis of client-centric and 
cloud-native data remnants left behind on Android smartphones by the Google Home and Google Assistant apps used to 
control a Google Nest device. We identified the main database and file system storage location central to the Google Assistant 
ecosystem. From our analysis, we show forensic artifacts of interest associated with user account information, the chronology 
and copies of past voice conversations exchanged, and record of deleted data. The findings from this study describe forensic 
artifacts that could assist forensic investigators and can facilitate a criminal investigation.
Keywords Mobile forensics · Internet of Things forensics · Android forensics · Google Assistant · Google Home · Google 
Home Mini
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) industry has recently focused 
on creating internet-connected devices, which is predicted 
to be used in almost 40% of homes in the UK by 2022 [1]. 
This growing market has encouraged the proliferation and 
development of software applications and gadgets that 
enable remote monitoring and management of several IoT 
devices, especially in smart homes. It has created signifi-
cant interest amongst digital forensic researchers and a para-
digm shift towards a smart-home IoT forensic ecosystem 
and the evidence these devices produce [2]. Recently, there 
has been a huge demand by consumers in smart speakers 
such as Amazon Echo and Google Home, which feature a 
voice-activated digital assistant that allows users to control 
home automation hubs and other IoT devices using voice 
controls [3]. Google’s voice-activated digital assistant like 
Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, and Microsoft’s Cortana is 
called Google Assistant. As a digital virtual assistant cloud 
service, Google Assistant interacts with various compatible 
devices, native Google applications, and some third-party 
applications by converting the voice requests to native com-
munication protocols [4]. Google Nest devices (both the 
Nest and Google Home range) by default are compatible 
with Google Assistant. Google Assistant offers voice com-
mands and conversational interactions that allow users to 
conduct internet voice searches, perform voice-automated 
device control, play music, connect with friends and family 
through video calls and video messages, etc. after using “OK 
Google” or “Hey, Google” wake words. A single Google 
Nest device can generate large amounts of data and network 
traffic as it can be connected to other companion devices and 
applications simultaneously, making them sources of foren-
sic artifacts in forensic investigations. This always active, 
always generating characteristic makes them excellent digi-
tal witnesses, capturing traces of activities of potential use 
in investigations [5]. Figure 1 shows the typical architecture 
of the Google Assistant ecosystem [2] (based on the IoT 
forensics ecosystem) where all compatible and companion 
devices can interact with Google Assistant and the potential 
sources of forensic artifacts (network traffic, smart devices, 
cloud service, and mobile apps).
Law enforcement agents, legal experts, and forensic 
investigators have also taken a significant interest in IoT 
devices as sources of forensic artifacts [4], especially in 
 * Alex Akinbi 
 o.a.akinbi@ljmu.ac.uk
 Thomas Berry 
 t.berry@ljmu.ac.uk
1 Department of Computer Science, Liverpool John Moores 
University, Liverpool, UK
 SN Computer Science           (2020) 1:272  272  Page 2 of 10
SN Computer Science
scenarios where an IoT device has been a witness to a 
crime [6]. An example is a case in 2018, where a United 
States judge asked Amazon to hand over audio recordings 
from an Amazon Echo which was in a house where two 
women died [7]. The previous year, forensic evidence from 
a Fitbit was crucial in the conviction of a man suspected 
of killing his wife in Connecticut, USA [8]. Although 
IoT devices create opportunities for law enforcement 
and forensic investigators, there are huge challenges in 
the acquisition and analysis of forensic artifacts due to 
the quantity of data generated, the number and variety of 
devices, the heterogeneity of protocols used, and their dis-
tributed nature [5]. Besides, the storage capacity of smart-
phones that are synced with many smart-home IoT devices 
is increasing significantly with multiple apps installed 
which makes it difficult for investigators to identify data 
related to crimes for investigation [9].
In this study, we focus on the extraction and analysis 
of forensic artifacts of interest from the Google Home and 
Google Assistant apps installed and running on an Android 
smartphone and used to control a Google Nest device 
(Google Home Mini smart speaker). Our original contri-
butions in this paper include the exploration and analysis 
of the client-centric and cloud-native forensic artifacts that 
can be found as summarised below:
• We recover local copies of conversations exchanged 
between a user and Google Assistant stored in the main 
databases and file system of the Android smartphone;
• We show a chronology of two-way conversations 
between the user and Google Assistant stored in these 
storage locations;
• We recover copies of past conversations exchanged and 
stored on the user’s My Activity cloud service account.
This paper is organized as follows. In “Related Works”, 
we discuss related works. In “Forensic Acquisition and 
Analysis Methodology”, we discuss our forensic acquisition 
and analysis methodology including tools and their usage. 
In “Test Environment and Scenario”, we discuss the test 
environment and scenario used in our experiments. Foren-
sic analysis and findings from the technical experiment are 
presented in “Forensic Analysis and Findings”. Finally, in 
“Conclusion and Future Work” we conclude the paper and 
highlight potential future research areas.
Related Works
IoT forensics has been widely studied in recent literature 
[2, 10–15]. There has also been recent literature and studies 
that have focused on recovering forensic artifacts of interests 
from virtual assistant enabled devices and their compan-
ion devices. Chung et al. [4], focused on the client-centric 
and cloud-native artifacts stored on companion clients of 
the Amazon Echo. Li et al. [16], analyzed forensic artifacts 
retrieved from the Amazon Echo as a use case to demon-
strate their proposed forensic analysis model. Forensic 
analysis of Amazon echo was also conducted in a study by 
Shin et al. [17]. Hyde and Moran [18] presented a forensic 
examination of Alexa Echo Dot, generation 1 and 2, and the 
Echo generation 1 controlled by Android smartphones. They 
acquired data remnants directly from the motherboards of 
the Echo via the device’s universal asynchronous transmitter 
receiver (UART) and companion mobile apps and retrieved 
the Wi-Fi information from the Alexa device’s memory and 
user information from Alexa and Kasa mobile apps.
Other studies include forensic analysis of the Securifi 
Almond+ (compatible with Amazon Alexa) [19], forensic 
analysis of Amazon Echo, and Nest Camera [5]. However, 
Fig. 1  Google Assistant ecosystem (a paradigm for smart-home IoT forensic ecosystem [2])  (Sources of device images: store.google.com)
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none of these studies covers the forensic analysis of Google 
Assistant and Google Nest device (Google Home Mini smart 
speaker) on Android platforms, which is the focus of this 
paper. Therefore, to address this gap in the literature and 
make the most of the potential impact of our study, we show 
an up-to-date understanding of the client-centric artifacts 
that can be extracted from an Android smartphone that has 
been used to interact with Google Assistant.
Forensic Acquisition and Analysis 
Methodology
In this study, we adopted two approaches in the acquisi-
tion and analysis of forensic artifacts of interest. Our first 
approach was to conduct an experiment to generate data that 
could be analyzed. We created an investigative scenario in 
a controlled test environment, to address the two investiga-
tive questions that are commonly encountered in IoT digital 
investigations (Sect. 4). In the scenario, we registered a sin-
gle Google test account using a Gmail address “behemoth-
pentestlab@gmail.com” to access Google services and login 
to the Google Assistant and Google Home apps which we 
installed on the Android smartphone. To set up the Google 
Home Mini smart speaker, the Google Home, and Google 
Assistant apps must be installed [20]. We then proceed to 
use the Google Assistant app to initiate voice commands and 
two-way conversations with Google Assistant and control 
the Google Home Mini device. This was done to make the 
scenario realistic and retrieve as many forensic artifacts as 
possible.
In our second approach, we adopted Quick and Choo’s 
method of evidence source identification, acquisition, and 
analysis [21, 22]. Client-centric forensic artifacts were iden-
tified and extracted from the Android smartphone (compan-
ion device) associated with the Google Assistant and Google 
Home apps by accessing the internal memory on the device. 
The primary goal was to conduct a post-mortem by imaging 
the smartphone and accessing data residing on the internal 
flash memory [17]. We accessed the internal memory of the 
Samsung Galaxy S9 smartphone running Android Pie 9.0 
using Cellebrite UFED 4PC v. 7.28 forensic software. The 
software is a suitable commercial tool that exploits a boot 
loader vulnerability that exists via a locked screen bypass in 
a forensically sound manner. Finally, we analyzed the extrac-
tion using Cellebrite Physical Analyzer v. 7.25 [23].
To access the “My Activity” cloud service account and 
extract cloud-native artifacts containing the user’s past con-
versations, we used the Google account credentials that 
were retrieved from the Android smartphone extraction. 
We parsed the credentials remotely using Cellebrite’s UFED 
Cloud Analyzer v 7.8 [24] and downloaded an archive that 
contains a chronology of conversations exchanged between 
the user and Google Assistant. The archive was then ana-
lyzed for forensic artifacts of interest using Cellebrite Physi-
cal Analyzer v. 7.25. For all the extractions, SHA256 hash 
values were calculated for original file verification. The list 
of each tool in our experiment and their usage is presented 
in Table 1.
Test Environment and Scenario
The experiment conducted in this study is structured around 
two investigative questions that are commonly encountered 
in IoT digital investigations and are listed as follows:
1. What client-centric forensic artifacts of interest can be 
obtained on an Android smartphone that has the Google 
Home and Google Assistant apps installed and inte-
grated with the Google Home Mini smart speaker?
2. What cloud-native forensic artifacts of interest asso-
ciated with Google Assistant can be retrieved from a 
user’s personal “My Activity” Google cloud account?
In this section, we list the details of the test environment 
and scenario used in our experiments. In our scenario crea-
tion, all devices were connected to the same Wi-Fi local 
area network (LAN). The Google Home Mini smart speaker 
was voice-controlled using the Google Assistant app on the 
smartphone and the Google Home app is used to manage 
the speaker settings. We created a personal smart-home 
network for the Google Home Mini smart speaker and 
named it “Office speaker”. YouTube Music (cloud service) 
was configured as the default service for playing music and 
Google Chrome browser app was also configured as the 
default browser by making changes in the Google Home 
app services and privacy settings. Finally, we configured the 
Table 1  Forensic tools and 
usage Forensics level Hardware Software Software usage
Client-centric Samsung Galaxy S9 
(Android Pie 9.0)
Cellebrite UFED 4PC 
(v 7.28)
Cellebrite Physical 
Analyzer (v 7.25)
To extract and analyze 
Android forensic 
memory image
Cloud-native Cellebrite’s UFED 
Cloud Analyzer v 7.8
To extract cloud data
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smartphone to use Google app as the default search engine. 
These apps were all installed as recommended in the initial 
set up for Google Home Mini smart speaker [20]. A sum-
mary of test devices and applications installed in the experi-
ment is shown in Table 2.
During the setup of the Google Home Mini smart speaker, 
we were required to train Google Assistant for voice rec-
ognition and identification with the Google Assistant app 
using the ‘Ok Google’ or ‘Hey Google’ wake words several 
times. According to Google, the Google Home Mini smart 
speaker may be used by all household members, and this 
setup process allows each member of the household to use 
voice match to customize their personal experience with the 
smart speaker [20]. Finally, we initialized a set of voice com-
mands and conversations using the Google Assistant app to 
enable us to validate our findings and results (See Table 3).
Forensic Analysis and Findings
In this section, we present the client-centric forensic analysis 
and findings of Google Assistant on Android smartphones. 
In Sect. 5.2, we present the cloud-native forensic analysis 
and results.
Android Client‑Centric Analysis and Findings
From the Android physical extraction, we found raw cop-
ies of voice recordings we used to train Google Assistant 
using the OK Google or Hey Google wake words. These 
audio files are in the /data/data/com.google.android.
googlequicksearchbox/app_sid directory in the format 
“UTCtimestamp-behemothpentestlab@gmail.com-OK_
HEY.pcm”. The audio files were downloaded and played 
through Audacity by importing the raw data with encod-
ing: signed 16-bit pcm, no endianness byte order, 1 chan-
nel (mono), 0-byte start offset at a sample rate 19000 Hz.
The most significant forensic artifacts of interest are 
stored in the main opa_history SQLite database. All voice 
conversations exchanged between the user and the Google 
Assistant are stored in this database and contains eight 
different tables (see Fig. 2). From our findings, only four 
out of these eight tables contain information of forensic 
interest namely “accounts”, “entries”, “turns” and “dele-
tions”. The opa_history database is located within the 
Google App package path directory “/data/data/com.
google.android.googlequicksearchbox/databases”. This 
is because upon receiving voice search queries, Google 
Assistant uses an intent filter called “SEARCH_ACTION”, 
to launch the default search engine (Google App) to carry 
out the search and action queries on the internet. The voice 
search request is then passed to the default search engine 
Table 2  Test device and 
applications in the experiment Detail Description
Google Nest device Google Home Mini, Model Number: GA00216-UK
Test device Samsung Galaxy S9 (Android Pie 9.0) Model: SM-G960F
Installed applications Application name Android version(s)
Google Home App 2.14.50.11
Google Chrome App 77.03
Google Assistant App 0.1.187
Google App 10.65
YouTube Music Cloud service
Gmail account behemothpentestlab@gmail.com
Table 3  Test scenario voice commands and requests
Voice commands Date and time initiated
Create a shopping list Oct 10, 2019, at 10:06 A.M UTC 
Play Led Zeppelin on Office 
speaker
Oct 10, 2019, at 09:40 A.M UTC 
Play music on Office speaker Oct 10, 2019, at 09:39 A.M UTC 
What’s the time? Oct 10, 2019, at 09:36 A.M UTC 
Ok Google play the news Oct 10, 2019, at 08:40 A.M UTC 
Fig. 2  Structure of the main opa_history database
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(Google App) for the query to be completed. We now dis-
cuss the contents of each table and how they correlate to 
answer questions from our scenario.
Identifying User Accounts
The accounts table contains information associated with the 
user’s Gmail account and is stored in the “name” field and 
assigned a unique identifier which is stored in the “id” field 
(See Fig. 3).
Identifying Conversations Exchanged
The entries table store records of all voice conversations 
exchanged between the user and Google Assistant as a binary 
large object (BLOB) in the “entry” field. Each record stored 
in this field is assigned a unique identifier (primary key) and 
stored in the “id” field. Cellebrite Physical Analyzer v. 7.25 
can partially decode the text translation in the BLOB into 
plaintext which makes it human-readable (See Fig. 4). From 
this figure we can see in the 33rd record, a voice request 
“Play music on office speaker” and the 35th record shows 
the response from Google Assistant “OK, music from You-
Tube Music. Playing on Office speaker”. In our scenario, we 
noticed that if Google Assistant needs to perform a request 
which requires access to a service such as YouTube music or 
Google search engine, the slight delay is recorded “android-
linear-layout2” as shown in the 34th record in the table. In 
the figure, we also see our voice request in the 52nd record 
“create shopping list” and the response in the 53rd record 
“Alright starting a list called shopping…”.
Reconstructing Chronology of Conversations Exchanged
The turns table (See Fig. 5), contains a timestamp for each 
entry in the entries table in chronological order. Each times-
tamp is assigned a unique identifier stored in the “id” field 
(primary key).
Both the entries and turns table are linked together by 
means of a foreign key in the entries table named “turn_id”. 
The turns table is also linked to the accounts table by means 
of the foreign key named “account_id”. To illustrate the 
chronology of voice conversations exchanged, we linked the 
relationships between the accounts, entries, and turns tables 
to reconstruct the date and time as shown in Fig. 6. In this 
figure, we see one distinct user account behemothpentest-
lab@gmail.com (“id = 1”) in the accounts table is associated 
with the “account_id = 1” from the turns table. Likewise, 
the “id” field in the turns table is associated with the “turn_
id” field from the entries table. In the 33rd record of the 
entries table (id = 33, turn_id = 31 and event_id = ‘RPyeXf-
fAHOzImwXc7KDQBQ’), we see the voice request “Play 
music on office speaker” was sent on the 10th Oct. 2019 at 
09:39:17 A.M UTC (Unix Timestamp = ‘1570700357517’). 
The 35th record (id = 35, turn_id = 32, and ‘RPyeXffAHOz-
ImwXc7KDQBQ’) shows the response from Google Assis-
tant “OK, music from YouTube Music. Playing on Office 
speaker…” was received on the 10th Oct. 2019 at 09:39:17 
A.M UTC (Unix Timestamp = ‘1570700357582’). The 
matching event_id, date, and time show a direct response to 
the voice request which represents a two-way conversation.
Dealing with Deleted Conversations
Record of deleted voice searches, requests, or conversations 
is stored in the deletions table. The table stores records of 
each deleted conversation as an event in the “event_id” field. 
The account_id and event_id fields both link the deletions 
and turns table together. This makes it possible to recon-
struct a deleted event associated with a user account. In our 
scenario, we deleted a previous voice request (“Play music 
on office speaker”) by logging into the user’s online “My 
Activity” account. Figure 7 shows a record of the deleted 
data in the entries table (id = 5). We observed a record of 
the deletion as shown in the deletions table (id = 1) and turns 
table (id = 5) match using the unique value stored in both 
tables’ event_id fields. Using Cellebrite Physical Analyzer’s 
DB Viewer carving tool, we were able to recover the deleted 
record from the entries table as shown in the figure.
Cloud‑Native Forensics: Analysis and Findings
Copies of voice commands, requests, and searches initiated 
by the user with Google Assistant are automatically stored in 
real time in the user’s Google My Activity cloud account. The 
record contains the test translation of a request and response 
Fig. 3  Accounts table
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Fig. 4  Entries table
Fig. 5  Turns table
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and an audio recording of the user’s request which can be 
played back. In our scenario, we recovered the entire cloud-
native archive which contains both text and audio logs in 
a zip file archive(Fig. 8). We parsed the user’s credentials 
obtained from the forensic extraction into Cellebrite UFED 
Cloud Analyzer and were able to download raw copies of 
these files via Google Takeout. We describe the findings 
from our analysis of this cloud-native archive as follows.
All voice commands initiated in our test scenario using 
the Google Assistant app were stored as UTC time-stamped 
mp3 audio files (Fig. 6). For example, the voice command 
“Play Led Zeppelin on office speaker” initiated on the 
10th Oct. 2019 at 09:40 AM UTC was stored in the format 
“2019-10-10_09_40_18_590_UTC.mp3”. We were able to 
extract, play and listen to the voice recording. A log of all text 
translations of each voice request and search are appended 
with their respective audio mp3 file name and saved in an 
HTML file named “MyAtivity.html” (See Fig. 9). We were 
also able to recover the shopping list we created using voice 
controls on October 10, 2019, at 11:06 A.M stored as a 
CSV file named “shopping2019-10-10_10_06_26.791.csv”. 
Table 4 shows a description of the forensic relevance of each 
artifact of interest recovered from the cloud-native archive. 
Fig. 6  Reconstructing voice conversations
Fig. 7  Recovering deleted conversations
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Conclusion and Future Work
Apps and devices integrated with Google Assistant can be 
a silent witness to a crime. The always listening capability 
of this virtual assistant and record keeping of past conversa-
tions can be crucial in criminal investigations. For forensic 
investigators, being able to recover these forensic artifacts, 
reconstruct the sequence of events and recover deleted data 
is vital. In this paper, we discussed the forensic analysis of 
Google Assistant, a virtual assistant developed by Google 
and primarily available on mobile and smart home IoT 
devices. We showed client-centric forensic artifacts stored 
in the main opa_history SQLite database on Android smart-
phones which contain all local copies of voice conversations 
exchanged with Google Assistant.
We were able to reconstruct past conversations, time 
and date of occurrence, identify user account information, 
and recover deleted conversations from the database tables. 
We have also shown how cloud-native artifacts which hold 
records of all past conversations stored in the user’s My 
Activity cloud account.
In our experiments, we observed requests made by 
the user to the Google Home Mini device needs to begin 
with Ok Google or Hey Google wake word. However, its 
use is not a prerequisite for conversations initiated using 
Fig. 8  Exported UFDR zip file imported into Cellebrite Physical 
Analyzer
Fig. 9  Logs saved as MyActiv-
ity.html
Table 4  Summary of contents from My Activity cloud extraction
Folder name Contents Application in digital forensics
Assistant This folder includes time-stamped audio MP3 files, 
which contains exchanged conversations with Google 
Assistant
A file named Activity.html- text log of user voice interac-
tion with Google Assistant and associated mp3 file 
name of each voice request recorded
Provides investigators with raw copies of audio recordings 
and timestamp of conversations exchanged
Assistant notes and links CSV file with Shopping List with items in plain text:
shopping2019-10-10_10_06_26.791.csv
Folder stores information associated with reminders cre-
ated by the user
Search MyActivity.html file contains a log of exchanged conver-
sations in plaintext
Provides investigators with information associated with 
past audio recordings in plaintext, a chronology of 
conversations exchanged, and the GPS locations of the 
smartphone if enabled
Voice and audio This folder includes several MP3 files, which include 
audio and voice recordings of user interactions with the 
Google Assistant
Provides investigators with raw copies of audio recordings 
and chronology of past conversations
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the Google Assistant app provided the microphone button 
is active. Therefore, audio recordings can be accidentally 
recorded and saved. All voice conversations initiated by the 
user are stored in mp3 audio formats in the Video and Audio 
folder in the My Activity cloud account. However, in the 
main database, they are stored as BLOBs, a combination 
of multimedia objects and text. Using a database viewer, 
some of the text in the BLOBs can be viewed and can pro-
vide valuable forensic information in cases where a user has 
deleted similar records stored in My Activity cloud account.
Before this research, there have been few works of litera-
ture on the forensic analysis of Google Assistant-enabled 
devices and mobile apps. In this paper, we showed foren-
sic acquisition and analysis of client-centric data remnants 
left behind by the Google Assistant and Google Home apps 
synced with Android smartphones and used to control the 
Google Home Mini smart speaker. We also described how 
these artifacts can assist forensic investigators in scenarios 
where Google Assistant is a witness to a crime.
In our future work, we intend to analyze other potential 
sources of forensic artifacts which include network and the 
Google Nest devices for remnants of forensic value. Our 
future work should also involve Google Assistant analysis 
on other platforms including iOS.
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